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Abstract
We consider games with a continuum of players and intermediate prefer-
ences. We show that any such game has a Nash equilibrium that induces a
partition of the set of attributes into a bounded number of convex sets with
the following property: all players with an attribute in the interior of the same
element of the partition play the same action. Furthermore, if the game induces
an absolutely continuous distribution (with respect to the Lebesgue measure)
on the attribute space, then we can strengthen the conclusion by showing that
all players with an attribute in the same element of the partition play the same
action.
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We then use these results to show that all sufficiently large, equicontinuous
games with intermediate preferences have an approximate equilibrium with the
same properties in both cases (for the stronger result, we require the attribute
space to be a subset of the real line).
Our result on behavior conformity for large finite game generalizes Theorem
3 of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) by allowing both a wider class of
preferences and a more general attribute space.
1 Introduction
Consider an individual who lives in the suburbs of a large city and who can only reach
her office in the city center by driving over one of two bridges. While the choice of
which bridge to take depends on attributes such as her home and office locations and
how pleasant either route may be, it also depends on the choice of all others driving
to the center, namely through their influence on how crowded each bridge is. In this
example, it is conceivable that equilibrium behavior displays individuals with similar
attributes choosing the same bridge. Such equilibrium can be interpreted as displaying
behavioral conformity in the sense that it induces a partition of the individuals into
a small number of societies (two in the example) of similar individuals making the
same choice.
Such form of conformity has been rationalized by Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten
(2006). In particular, for games where each player’s payoff depends only on his choice
and on the average choice of the others, they have shown that if preferences depend
linearly on individual attributes, then for all ε > 0, all sufficiently large games have
an ε – equilibrium that induces a partition of players into a small number of societies
(relative to the number of players), with an upper bound independent of ε.1
1Their Theorem 2 shows that by allowing the number of societies to depend on ε, a similar
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In this paper, we extend the framework of Wooders et al. among several dimen-
sions. We do this by allowing for preferences that do not satisfy the continuity and
linearity assumptions, by considering a stronger notion of behavioral conformity, and
by allowing for a continuum of players.
Our results rely on the notion of quasi-intermediate preferences, which is obtained
by dropping the continuity requirement of intermediate preferences, introduced in
Grandmont (1978). These preferences allow us to obtain the existence of a Nash
equilibrium displaying strong behavioral conformity in dispersed games with a con-
tinuum of players in the following sense: all players in the same society, including
those in its boundaries, play the same action. Furthermore, it allows us to obtain the
existence of a Nash equilibrium displaying behavioral conformity (where all players
in the interior of a society play the same action) when the game is not dispersed
(i.e., when there is a positive measure of players with the same attribute). These
two results are then used to obtain similar results for games with a large, but finite
number of players.
An advantage of our approach is that our result on social conformity for large finite
games generalizes Theorem 3 in Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006). In fact, we
show that the same conclusion can be reached under more general assumptions on the
attribute space and on players’ preferences: the attribute space can be any bounded,
convex and (Borel) measurable subset of RL, and the function assigning preferences
to players need only be measurable, quasi-intermediate and have an equicontinuous
image.
Despite such generalization, the main advantage of focusing on games with a
continuum of players with quasi-intermediate preferences is conceptual. Indeed, it
clarifies the essential elements needed for behavioral conformity and allows for simple,
conclusion holds under more general preferences.
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constructive proofs that can be used to construct equilibria displaying behavioral
conformity in applications.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the notation and
main definitions. In Section 3 we consider dispersed anonymous games (as in Mas-
Colell (1984)) with quasi-intermediate preferences; the results in this section are not
only interesting in their own right, but also serve as tools for several others in the
paper. In Section 4, we generalize the notion of quasi-intermediate preferences and
use it to obtain a stronger existence result in binary games (i.e., games with only
two actions). Section 5 considers games with a continuum of players as defined in
Schmeidler (1973), and Section 6 examines games with a large, but finite number of
players. In Section 7 we consider the relationship between our results and Theorem 3
of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006). Some concluding remarks are in Section
8. Finally, the Appendix contains the proof of the lemmas and some other auxiliary
results.
2 Notation and Definitions
In this section, we present the classes of games we consider. Then, we introduce the
equilibrium concept that we use for each of them, as well as our behavioral conformity
concepts. To simplify the presentation, we assume that there is a single crowding type.
The (straightforward) extension to an arbitrary number of crowding types is discussed
in Subsection 2.4 and in the remarks following the proof of Theorem 1.
2.1 Pregames, Induced Anonymous Games and Induced Games
We focus on games and anonymous games that are derived from pregames as in
Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006). In all cases, we assume that each player’s
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preferences depend on her action and on the distribution of actions chosen by all
players, which corresponds to the global interaction property of Wooders, Cartwright,
and Selten (2006).2 Throughout the paper, A denotes a finite set of actions, M
denotes the set of probability measures on A and U the set of continuous functions
u : A ×M → R. The space U is endowed with the sup norm, which makes it a
complete, separable metric space. Since A is finite, M can be identified with the
standard unit simplex in R|A|, and so we endow it with the sup norm. Furthermore,
we sometimes represent a probability measure µ ∈M by the vector µ = (µ1, . . . , µ|A|),
where A = {a1, . . . , a|A|} and µi = µ({ai}) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |A|.
A pregame consists of a particular description of the primitive elements of games.
Indeed, it is defined by an action space, by an attribute space and by a preference
function, associating a payoff function to every attribute; hence, in order to obtain
a game from a pregame, one has simply to associate an attribute to every player.
Formally, a pregame G is described by a bounded, convex, Borel measurable attribute
space Ω ⊆ RL, L ≥ 1, a finite action space A, and a Borel measurable preference
function U : Ω → U .3 We denote such pregame by G = (Ω, U,A). Note that the
measurability assumption on U generalizes the continuity in the attributes assumption
of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006).
A class of games that can be obtained from pregames is that of anonymous games.
The distinctive feature of an anonymous game is that there is no explicit reference
to the players who will play the game; in fact, one is given only a statistical image
of their preferences through a distribution on U . A pregame induces an anonymous
game simply by associating to it a probability measure λ defined on the measurable
2See Section 7 for the details.
3Throughout the paper, measurable will be understood to indicate Borel measurable.
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subsets of Ω. This measure λ and U define a measure λ ◦ U−1 on U by
λ ◦ U−1(B) = λ({ω ∈ Ω : U(ω) ∈ B}) (1)
for all measurable subsets B of U . Thus, an induced anonymous game G is described
by a probability measure λ on Ω and by a pregame G˜ = (Ω, U, A), and so we denote
it by G = (λ,Ω, U,A). The measure λ describes the demographics of the pregame
G˜ = (Ω, U,A), since roughly, for all measurable subsets C of Ω, λ(C) is the fraction
of the population with an attribute in C. Similarly, λ ◦ U−1(B) is the fraction of the
population with a payoff function in B ⊆ U .
In contrast, a game makes explicit the set of players. As above, we can obtain a
game from a given pregame. Since the pregame already lists the set of actions and
the preferences associated with each attribute, a game induced by a pregame (an
induced game, for short) is defined by any function assigning an attribute to every
player. Formally, an induced game is described by a set T of players, a measure
ϕ on T describing the relative weight of players, a measurable attribute function
α : T → Ω assigning an attribute to each player and a pregame G˜ = (Ω, U,A). Thus,
we represent such a game by G = (T, ϕ, α,Ω, U, A). Clearly, these elements allow us
to define a game in the usual way, by listing its (measure space of) players (T, ϕ), their
action space A, and their payoff function, here defined by the measurable function
U ◦ α that assigns payoff functions to players.
Both induced anonymous games and induced games can be classified according
to the properties of their defining elements. A binary induced anonymous game
(resp. induced game) is an induced anonymous game (resp. induced game) satisfying
|A| = 2. An induced anonymous game G is dispersed if λ is absolutely continuous
with respect to the Lebesgue measure `. This condition means that λ(B) = 0 for all
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measurable sets B such that `(B) = 0.4 In particular, λ({ω}) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω, and
so λ is nonatomic.
Regarding induced games, we use both the measure space of players and the
attribute function to classify them. An induced gameG = (T, ϕ, α,Ω, U, A) is injective
if α is an injective function and it is dispersed if the probability measure ϕ ◦ α−1 is
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. An induced game with
a continuum of players is an induced game G = (T, ϕ, α,Ω, U, A) satisfying T = [0, 1]
and ϕ = `. That is, the set of players is the unit interval endowed with the Lebesgue
measure.
Similarly, for all n ∈ N, an induced game with n players is an induced game
G = (T, ϕ, α,Ω, U,A) where the set of players is a finite set with n elements endowed
with the uniform measure. Formally, let Tn = {1, . . . , n} and νn be the uniform
measure on Tn (i.e., νn satisfies νn({t}) = 1/n for all t ∈ Tn). Then, G is an induced
game with n players if T = Tn and ϕ = νn.
2.2 Equilibrium Concepts
We start by defining strategies for induced anonymous games and for induced games.
For induced games, a strategy is a (measurable) function from players into actions
(e.g., Schmeidler (1973)). Regarding induced anonymous games, we also define strate-
gies as a function into actions, but this time defined on the attribute space. Essen-
tially, it is as if players were named according to its attribute.5
Thus, a strategy in an induced anonymous game G = (λ,Ω, U, A) is a measurable
4Note that `(Ω) > 0 since λ(Ω) = 1. Hence, for example, λ defined by λ(B) = `(B)/`(Ω) for
all measurable subsets B of Ω is a probability measure on Ω which is absolutely continuous with
respect to the Lebesgue measure.
5Hence, it corresponds to a symmetric equilibrium (see Mas-Colell (1984)).
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function f : Ω → A. A strategy in an induced game G = (T, ϕ, α,Ω, U,A) is a
measurable function f : T → A. Of course, if T is finite, then the measurability
requirement is trivially satisfied.6
The definition of equilibrium for induced games depends on whether an induced
game has a continuum of players or not. The main difference lies in the fact that
if there is a continuum of players, the action of a single one has no impact on the
distribution of actions. Therefore, a strategy is a Nash equilibrium if all players are
choosing an optimal action given the distribution induced by it on the set of actions.
Formally, a Nash equilibrium of an induced game G = ([0, 1], `, α,Ω, U,A) with a
continuum of players is a strategy f such that
Uα(t)(f(t), ` ◦ f−1) ≥ Uα(t)(a, ` ◦ f−1) (2)
for all a ∈ A and all t ∈ [0, 1].
Note that a dispersed induced anonymous game is like an induced game with a
continuum of players under the interpretation that the set of players is Ω. In fact,
both ([0, 1], `) and (Ω, λ) are nonatomic measure spaces. Therefore, the definition
of a Nash equilibrium for induced anonymous games follows the one given above for
induced games. A strategy f in a dispersed induced anonymous game G = (λ,Ω, U,A)
is a Nash equilibrium of G if
Uω(f(ω), λ ◦ f−1) ≥ Uω(a, λ ◦ f−1) (3)
for all ω ∈ Ω and a ∈ A.
6If A = {a1, . . . , am} has m elements, we can represent it by the standard unit basis {e1, . . . , em}
of Rm and represent a strategy f : T → A by a function g : T → {e1, . . . , em} defined by g(t) = ei if
and only if f(t) = ai. Then, regarding ϕ ◦ f−1 as a vector in Rm, it follows that ϕ ◦ f−1 =
∫
T
gdϕ
(see Rath (1995, Lemma 1)). With this remark in mind, it is appropriate to describe the class of
games we consider as games where each player’s payoff depends only on his choice and on the average
choice of the others.
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In contrast to games with a continuum of players, each player’s choice affects the
distribution of actions in a game with a finite number of players. Given a strategy f
in an induced game G with n players, a ∈ A and t¯ ∈ T , let f \t¯ a be defined by:
f \t¯ a(t) =
 a if t = t¯,f(t) if t 6= t¯. (4)
In words, f \t¯ a is the strategy that results if player t¯ changes his action from f(t¯) to
a, which in turn changes the distribution on A from νn ◦ f−1 to νn ◦ (f \t¯ a)−1.
Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy f is an ε – equilibrium of an induced game G = (Tn, νn, α,Ω, U, A)
with n players if
Uα(t)(f(t), νn ◦ f−1) ≥ Uα(t)(a, νn ◦ (f \t a)−1)− ε
for all t ∈ Tn and all a ∈ A.
2.3 Behavioral Conformity
The notion of behavioral conformity we use is the one considered byWooders, Cartwright,
and Selten (2006) in their Theorem 3. For every strategy f , let A(f) = {a ∈ A :
f−1(a) 6= ∅} be the set of actions that are played by some player. A strategy f in an
induced game G displays behavioral conformity if there exists a partition of Ω into
|A(f)| convex subsets {Ca}a∈A(f) such that α−1(int(Ca)) ⊆ f−1(a) for all a ∈ A(f).
That is, f displays behavioral conformity if α(t) ∈ int(Ca) implies f(t) = a for all
t ∈ T and a ∈ A(f).
This notion of behavioral conformity can be strengthened by requiring that all
players in the same society play the same action. A strategy f in an induced game
G displays strong behavioral conformity if there exists a partition of Ω into |A(f)|
convex subsets {Ca}a∈A(f) such that f−1(a) = α−1(Ca) for all a ∈ A(f).
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This notion can also be defined for induced anonymous games as follows. A
strategy f in a induced anonymous game G displays strong behavioral conformity if
there exists a partition of Ω into |A(f)| convex subsets {Ca}a∈A(f) such that f−1(a) =
Ca for all a ∈ A(f).
2.4 Crowding Types
In this subsection, we consider the case where an attribute can be decomposed into
a crowding type and a taste type, as in Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006). As
in their paper, assume the attribute space equals C × Ω, where C = {c1, . . . , cm} is
interpreted as the set of crowding types and Ω as the set of taste types.
In the context, players care about the distribution of actions for every crowding
type, and so payoff functions are continuous functions v : A ×Mm → R. Letting V
be the space of all such functions, a pregame is now defined by the attribute space
C × Ω, by a measurable preference function U : C × Ω→ V and by the action space
A.
As before, a pregame and a probability measure λ on C × Ω defines an in-
duced anonymous game. Clearly, this measure can be decomposed into m measures
(λ1, . . . , λm) such that λi is a measure on {ci} × Ω. A strategy is now a measur-
able function f : C × Ω → A, which again can be written as (f1, . . . , fm) with
fi : {ci} × Ω → A. Finally, a strategy f is a Nash equilibrium if U(c,ω)(f(c, ω), λ1 ◦
f−11 , . . . , λ1 ◦ f−11 ) ≥ U(c,ω)(a, λ1 ◦ f−11 , . . . , λ1 ◦ f−11 ) for all (c, ω) ∈ C ×Ω and a ∈ A.
Clearly, a similar definition can be presented for induced games, both with a contin-
uum and a finite number of players.
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3 Quasi-Intermediate Preferences
In this section, we show that if players’ preferences in a dispersed induced anonymous
game satisfy some convexity properties, then every distribution over the set of actions
induced by a Nash equilibrium can be obtained by a Nash equilibrium displaying
strong behavioral conformity. Thus, every statistical image of the play of such a
game — provided by the distribution over the actions — can be understood as a
consequence of (strong) behavioral conformity by the players.
The notion of convexity of preferences needed for this result is (a generalization
of) that of intermediate preferences, introduced by Grandmont (1978).
This notion is defined in the following way: The preference u is between u1 and
u2 if for all µ ∈M, a and a¯ ∈ A,
1. u1(a, µ) ≥ u1(a¯, µ) and u2(a, µ) ≥ u2(a¯, µ) implies u(a, µ) ≥ u(a¯, µ);
2. u1(a, µ) > u1(a¯, µ) and u2(a, µ) > u2(a¯, µ) implies u(a, µ) > u(a¯, µ);
3. [u1(a, µ) = u1(a¯, µ) and u2(a, µ) > u2(a¯, µ)] or [u1(a, µ) > u1(a¯, µ) and u2(a, µ) =
u2(a¯, µ)] implies u(a, µ) > u(a¯, µ).
Then, the family of preferences U(Ω) is quasi-intermediate if for all ω, ω¯ ∈ Ω and
γ ∈ (0, 1), Uω˜ is between Uω and Uω¯ where ω˜ = γω + (1− γ)ω¯.
Note that this definition generalizes Grandmont’s notion of intermediate prefer-
ences, since it does not require the set {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a, µ) ≥ Uω(a¯, µ)} to be closed in
Ω, for every a and a¯ in A and all µ ∈M. Furthermore, it follows from Example 3 in
Grandmont (1978) that it also generalizes the linearity in the taste types assumption
of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006).
The following theorem is our behavioral conformity result for this class of prefer-
ences in dispersed induced anonymous games.
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Theorem 1 Let G = (λ,Ω, U, A) be a dispersed induced anonymous game such that
U(Ω) is quasi-intermediate. Then, for every Nash equilibrium f of G, there exists
a Nash equilibrium h of G that displays strong behavioral conformity and satisfies
λ ◦ h−1 = λ ◦ f−1. In particular, there exists a Nash equilibrium that displays strong
behavioral conformity.
Theorem 1 shows that if players’ preferences in a dispersed induced anonymous
game are quasi-intermediate, then every distribution induced by a Nash equilibrium
in A can also be induced by a Nash equilibrium displaying behavioral conformity. The
existence of a Nash equilibrium for this class of games (Schmeidler (1973); see also
Khan and Sun (2002, Theorem 2)), then implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium
that displays strong behavioral conformity.7
The idea of the proof is illustrated by the following examples. The first example
is of a trivial induced anonymous game in which all players are indifferent between
all actions: Let Ω = [0, 1], λ = `, A = {a1, a2} and Uω(a, µ) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω, a ∈ A
and µ ∈M. In this induced anonymous game, every strategy is a Nash equilibrium,
and so, one easily constructs a Nash equilibrium f of G that does not display strong
behavioral conformity. For example,
f(ω) =
 a1 if ω ∈ [0, 1/3] ∪ [2/3, 1],a2 otherwise. (5)
The distribution induced by f on A is ` ◦ f−1({a1}) = 2/3 and ` ◦ f−1({a2}) = 1/3.
This distribution can be easily obtained by a Nash equilibrium h displaying strong
7Note that Theorem 2 in Khan and Sun (2002) guarantees the existence of a strategy such that
almost all players best-reply. However, we can change it in a set of measure zero if necessary in
order to guarantee that all players best-reply.
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behavioral conformity. Indeed, let
h(ω) =
 a1 if ω ∈ [0, 2/3],a2 otherwise. (6)
More generally, in order to deal with the case of several actions being indifferent for
all players, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let λ be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, C ⊆
RL be a bounded, measurable, convex set and c1, c2, . . . , ck ∈ R be such that ci ≥ 0 for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and ∑ki=1 ci = λ(C).
Then, there exists a convex partition {Ci}ki=1 of C satisfying λ(Ci) = ci for all i.
We can use Lemma 1 in the above example by considering C = Ω, L = 1, c1 =
` ◦ f−1({a1}) = 2/3 and c2 = ` ◦ f−1({a2}) = 1/3.
The second example we consider is an induced anonymous game in which players
are inhabitants of a city with two bridges. Bridge 1 has a better view than that
of bridge 2, and players’ preferences depend on this fact and on how crowded each
bridge is. For concreteness, let Ω = [0, 1]× [0, 1], λ = ` and A = {b1, b2}. In order to
define players’ preferences, let µ1 = µ({b1}) for all µ ∈ M and u : A ×M → R2 be
defined by
u(a, µ) =
 (1− µ1, 1) if a = b1,(µ1, 0) if a = b2. (7)
and Uω(a, µ) = ω ·u(a, µ). The first component of u reflects the level of congestion of
each bridge: if µ1 is higher than 1/2, it means that bridge 1 is more congested than
bridge 2, and so the first component of u is higher for bridge 2 than for bridge 1. The
second component simply expresses that bridge 1 has a better view than bridge 2.
Finally, ω measures how much weight a player attributes to the view seen from the
bridge and to its level of congestion. For example, player ω = (1, 0) cares only about
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the level of congestion, while player ω = (0, 1) cares only about the view seen from
each bridge.
A Nash equilibrium of this induced anonymous game is
f(ω) =

b1 if ω2 > ω1/2,
b1 if ω2 = ω1/2 and ω1 ∈ [0, 1/3],
b1 if ω2 = ω1/2 and ω1 ∈ [2/3, 1],
b2 otherwise.
(8)
In order to show that f is in fact a Nash equilibrium, we introduce the following
notation. Let BRω(τ) = {a ∈ A : Uω(a, τ) ≥ Uω(a˜, τ) for all a˜ ∈ A} denote the set of
best-replies of player ω when the distribution of actions is τ . Since the distribution
induced by f on A is ` ◦ f−1({b1}) = 3/4, one easily sees that
BRω(λ ◦ f−1) =

{b1} if ω2 > ω1/2,
{b1, b2} if ω2 = ω1/2,
{b2} otherwise.
(9)
Hence, all players are playing a best-reply.
However, f does not display strong behavioral conformity. Here, as it was in the
case above, the failure of this property depends on the way f is specified in the set of
players who are indifferent between the two actions. In this example, we can allocate
all the indifferent players to bridge 1 since the set of those players has measure zero
and so will not change the distribution over actions. Hence, the strategy h defined by
h(ω) =
 b1 if ω2 ≥ ω1/2,b2 otherwise. (10)
is a Nash equilibrium of G that displays strong behavioral conformity and induces
the same distribution on A as f .
In general, that this procedure of allocating all the indifferent players to a partic-
ular action can be used is guaranteed by the following lemma. It shows that if not
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all players are indifferent between two actions, the set of those that are indifferent is
contained in a hyperplane, which has Lebesgue measure zero (and so measure zero
for all measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to it).
Lemma 2 Let G = (Ω, U,A) be a pregame such that U(Ω) is quasi-intermediate,
µ ∈M and a and a¯ be such that there exists ω ∈ Ω satisfying Uω(a, µ) 6= Uω(a¯, µ).
Then, there exist qa,a¯ ∈ RL and ca,a¯ ∈ R such that qa,a¯ 6= 0 and
{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a, µ) = Uω(a¯, µ)} ⊆ {ω ∈ Ω : qa,a¯ · ω = ca,a¯}.
In the above example, the set {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(b1, ` ◦ f−1) = Uω(b2, ` ◦ f−1)} is
contained in {ω ∈ Ω : (−1, 1/2) · ω = 0}.
We turn to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let f be a Nash equilibrium of G. For convenience,
let τ = λ ◦ f−1. By definition, we have that τ({a}) = λ({ω ∈ Ω : f(ω) = a}). We
will use f to define a strategy h displaying strong behavioral conformity such that
λ ◦ h−1 = τ and h(ω) solves maxa∈A Uω(a, τ). Clearly, the two last properties imply
that h is a Nash equilibrium.
Define the following equivalence relation in A(f): a ∼ a′ if Uω(a, τ) = Uω(a′, τ)
for all ω ∈ Ω. Thus, action a is equivalent to a′ under ∼ if all players are indifferent
between a and a′ when the distribution is τ . Let Ai ⊆ A(f) be the set of actions
a ∈ A(f) for which there is a′ ∈ A(f), a′ 6= a, such that a ∼ a′ and, for every
a ∈ A(f), let [a] denote the equivalence class of action a. Thus, Ai is the set of
actions a ∈ A(f) such that [a] is not a singleton, or equivalently, A(f) \Ai is the set
of actions a ∈ A(f) such that [a] = {a}.
Enumerate Ai and A(f) \ Ai and write A(f) \ Ai = {a1, . . . , ak} and Ai =
{ak+1, . . . , aM}.
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For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, define
Ci =
(∩Mj=1{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) ≥ Uω(aj, τ)})∩
∩ (∩i−1j=1{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) > Uω(aj, τ)}) . (11)
Since both {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) ≥ Uω(a, τ)} and {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) > Uω(a, τ)} are
convex for all a ∈ A, then Ci is convex. Let
Bi = ∩Mj=1{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) ≥ Uω(aj, τ)} (12)
and
Si = ∩j 6=i{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) > Uω(aj, τ)}. (13)
The set Bi (resp. Si) is the set of players for whom ai is a (resp. the unique) best-reply
and so λ(Si) ≤ τ({ai}) ≤ λ(Bi).
Since Bi \ Ci ⊆ ∪i−1j=1{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai) = Uω(aj)}, it follows by Lemma 2 that for
all 1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1 there exist qi,j ∈ RL and ci,j ∈ R such that qi,j 6= 0 and
{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) = Uω(aj, τ)} ⊆ {ω ∈ Ω : qi,j · ω = ci,j}. (14)
Hence, λ(Bi \ Ci) = 0 and so τ({ai}) ≤ λ(Bi) = λ(Ci).
Similarly, Ci \ Si ⊆ ∪Mj=i+1{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai) = Uω(aj)}, and so λ(Ci) = λ(Si) =
τ({ai}), as above.
In conclusion, we have shown that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Ci is convex and λ(Ci) =
τ({ai}), i.e., for all a ∈ A(f) \ Ai, there exists a convex set Ca such that λ(Ca) =
τ({a}).
For all k + 1 ≤ i ≤M , let
Ei =
(∩Mj=1{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) ≥ Uω(aj, τ)})∩
∩ (∩i−1j=1{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(ai, τ) > Uω(aj, τ)}) . (15)
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Define Dk+1 = Ek+1 and, for all i > k + 1, define
Di =
 Dj if ai ∼ aj and j < i,Ei otherwise. (16)
Since Ej is convex for all k + 1 ≤ j ≤M , so is Di.
Let a¯ ∈ Ai and i ∈ {k + 1, . . . ,M} be such that a¯ = ai. Define
D[a¯] = ∪j:aj∈[a¯]Dj = Di (17)
since Dj = Di for all k + 1 ≤ j ≤M such that aj ∈ [a¯]. Thus, D[a¯] is convex.
Let
B[a¯] = ∩a∈A{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a¯, τ) ≥ Uω(a, τ)} (18)
and
S[a¯] = ∩a 6∈[a¯]{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a¯, τ) > Uω(a, τ)}. (19)
As above, one has that λ(D[a¯]) =
∑
a∈[a¯] τ({a}). Indeed, we have that λ(S[a¯]) ≤
τ([a¯]) ≤ λ(B[a¯]), both B[a¯] \D[a¯] and D[a¯] \S[a¯] are subsets of ∪a 6∈[a¯]{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a¯, τ) =
Uω(a, τ)}, which has λ – measure zero. Hence,
λ(D[a¯]) = λ(S[a¯]) ≤ τ([a¯]) ≤ λ(B[a¯]) = λ(D[a¯]). (20)
Since D[a¯] ⊆ RL is bounded, convex and satisfies λ(D[a¯]) = τ([a¯]) =
∑
a∈[a¯] τ({a}),
it follows by Lemma 1 that there exist disjoint convex subsets {Ca}a∈[a¯] of D[a¯] satis-
fying λ(Ca) = τ({a}) for all a ∈ [a¯] and D[a] = ∪a∈[a¯]Ca.
Hence, for all a ∈ A(f), there exists a convex subset Ca such that τ({a}) = λ(Ca).
Furthermore,
Ω =
(∪a∈A(f)\AiCa) ∪ (∪a∈AiDa) = ∪a∈A(f)Ca. (21)
and the family {Ca}a∈A(f) is disjoint. Thus, define h : Ω→ A by h(ω) = a if ω ∈ Ca.
Then h is a Nash equilibrium and induces a partition of Ω into M = |A(f)| ≤ |A|
convex sets.
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We conclude this section with a remark on how to extend Theorem 1 to the case
of several crowding types (see Subsection 2.4). Essentially, all it takes is to write
Ωi = {ci} × Ω for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) and f = (f1, . . . , fm), and then
apply the approach used in its proof to each i = 1, . . . ,m separately.
4 Generalized Quasi-Intermediate Preferences
The behavioral conformity result of Theorem 1 can be obtained under weaker re-
strictions on players’ preferences. Essentially, the generalization that we consider
dispenses with the property that indifference surfaces are hyperplanes, expressed in
the statement of Lemma 2. However, our approach in this case requires that the set
of action have only two actions.
Our notion of generalized quasi-intermediate preferences is as follows. A family
of preferences U(Ω) is generalized quasi-intermediate if {ω : Uω(a, µ) ≥ Uω(a¯, µ)} and
{ω : Uω(a, µ) > Uω(a¯, µ)} are convex for all a, a¯ ∈ A and µ ∈M.
This notion generalizes the notion of quasi-intermediate preferences since Uω1(a, µ) =
Uω1(a¯, µ) and Uω2(a, µ) > Uω2(a¯, µ) do not necessarily imply that Uω(a, µ) > Uω(a¯, µ)
where ω = γω1 + (1− γ)ω2, with γ ∈ (0, 1).
Note, however, that if U(Ω) is generalized quasi-intermediate, then the set {ω ∈
Ω : Uω(a, µ) = Uω(a¯, µ)} is convex for all a, a¯ ∈ A and all µ ∈ M since it equals
{ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a, µ) ≥ Uω(a¯, µ)} ∩ {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a¯, µ) ≥ Uω(a, µ)}.
For binary dispersed induced anonymous games, we can obtain the conclusion of
Theorem 1 assuming only that preferences are generalized quasi-intermediate.
Theorem 2 Let G = (λ,Ω, U, A) be a binary dispersed induced anonymous game
such that U(Ω) is generalized quasi-intermediate. Then, for every Nash equilibrium f
of G, there exists a Nash equilibrium h of G that displays strong behavioral conformity
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and satisfies λ ◦ h−1 = λ ◦ f−1. In particular, there exists a Nash equilibrium that
displays strong behavioral conformity.
The following example illustrates Theorem 2. It is again an example of a dispersed
induced anonymous game where the players are inhabitants of a city with two bridges.
In this example, there are three types of people: those who always prefer bridge 1,
those who always prefer bridge 2 and those whose preferences depend on how crowded
each bridge is.
Formally, for all i = 1, 2, 3, let ui : A×M→ R be defined by
u1(a, µ) =
 1 if a = b1,0 if a = b2, (22)
u2(a, µ) =
 0 if a = b1,1 if a = b2, (23)
and
u3(a, µ) =
 1− µ1 if a = b1,βµ1 if a = b2. (24)
We assume that β ∈ (1, 3), and so players with preferences described by u3 have a
bias toward bridge 2.
Let Ω = [0, 1]× [0, 1], λ = ` and U : Ω→ U be defined by
U(ω) =

u1 if ω2 > 2ω1,
u2 if ω2 < ω1/2,
u3 otherwise.
(25)
Clearly, players with preferences described by u1 (resp. u2) must play b1 (resp. b2)
in a Nash equilibrium. Regarding players with preferences described by u3, they are
best-replying if µ({b1}) = 1/(1 + β), since in this case they are indifferent between
the two bridges. Thus, if f is a strategy such that ` ◦ f−1({b1}) = 1/(1+β), f equals
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b1 in the set Ω1 := {ω ∈ Ω : ω2 > 2ω1} and it equals b2 in Ω2 := {ω ∈ Ω : ω2 < ω1/2},
then f is a Nash equilibrium.
Given the above, it is easy to construct a Nash equilibrium that does not display
strong behavioral conformity. As in Section 3, the failure of this property depends on
how a strategy is specified in the set of players who are indifferent between the two
actions. Note that, in contrast to the case in Section 3, the set of players who are
indifferent between the two actions is no longer a set of measure zero.
Our approach to obtain a Nash equilibrium h displaying behavioral conformity and
satisfying `◦h−1({b1}) = 1/(1+β) is as follows. Let H1 = {z ∈ R2 : (1/2,−1) ·z = 0}
and H2 = {z ∈ R2 : (2,−1) ·z = 0}; then, H1 is a hyperplane that separates the set of
players that weakly prefer b1 from the set of players that strictly prefer b2, while H2
separates the set of players that weakly prefer b2 from the set of players that strictly
prefer b1. Note also that
Ω ∩ {z ∈ R2 : (2,−1) · z ≥ 0} = {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(b1, ` ◦ f−1) ≥ Uω(b2, ` ◦ f−1)}. (26)
Our goal is to obtain a hyperplane H = {z : q∗ · z = d∗} such that {z : q∗ · z ≥
d∗} ⊆ {z ∈ R2 : (2,−1) · z ≥ 0} and `(Ω ∩ {z : q∗ · z ≥ d∗}) = 1/(1 + β). Then,
defining
h(ω) =
 b1 if q
∗ · ω ≥ d∗,
b2 otherwise,
(27)
the second property guarantees that ` ◦ h−1({b1}) = 1/(1 + β), while the first guar-
antees that h equals b1 in Ω1 and b2 in Ω2.
In this example, it is easy to verify that H = {z ∈ R2 : ((1 + β)/2,−1) · z = 0}.
In general, we use Lemma 3 and the intermediate value theorem to find the desired
hyperplane.
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Lemma 3 Let λ be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Let
c, d ∈ R and p, q, w ∈ RL satisfy p 6= 0, q 6= 0, p · w = c and q · w = d. For all
η ∈ [0, 1], define qη = ηp+ (1− η)q and
Cη = Ω ∩ {z ∈ RL : q · z ≥ d} ∩ {z ∈ RL : qη · z ≤ qη · w}.
Then, the function η 7→ λ(Cη) is continuous.
We turn next to the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let f be a Nash equilibrium of G and τ = λ ◦ f−1. We
can partition Ω in three sets Ω1, Ω2 and Ω3, where:
Ω1 = {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a1, τ) > Uω(a2, τ)}, (28)
Ω2 = {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a1, τ) < Uω(a2, τ)} and (29)
Ω3 = {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a1, τ) = Uω(a2, τ)}. (30)
By assumption, all these sets are convex. Also, note that λ(Ω1) ≤ τ({a1}) ≤ λ(Ω1 ∪
Ω3). We will assume that all Ωi, i = 1, 2, 3, have strictly positive measure, the other
cases being analogous.
Define h : Ω→ A as follows:
h(ω) =
 a1 if ω ∈ Ω˜,a2 otherwise, (31)
where Ω˜ satisfies
Ω1 ⊆ Ω˜ ⊆ Ω1 ∪ Ω3, (32)
λ(Ω˜) = τ({a1}) and (33)
both Ω˜ and Ω \ Ω˜ are convex. (34)
Thus, we have partitioned Ω into two convex sets. So, we are left to show that there
exists a set Ω˜ with the above properties.
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Since Ω1∪Ω3 and Ω2 are convex and disjoint, there is a hyperplane that separates
them: i.e., there are p 6= 0 and c such that p · x ≤ c ≤ p · y for all x ∈ Ω1 ∪Ω3 and all
y ∈ Ω2. Let H1 = {z ∈ RL : p · z = c}.
Also, we can separate Ω1 from Ω2 ∪Ω3: there exist q 6= 0, q ∈ RL and d ∈ R such
that q ·x ≤ d ≤ q · y for all x ∈ Ω1 and all y ∈ Ω2∪Ω3. Let H2 = {z ∈ RL : q · z = d}.
Let M = Ω ∩ {z ∈ RL : p · z ≤ c} ∩ {z ∈ RL : q · z ≥ d}. Thus, Ω3 ⊆ M .
If H1 = H2, then λ(Ω3) = 0 and we can let Ω˜ = Ω1. Hence, we may assume that
H1 6= H2. We will consider two cases.
Suppose first that H1 is parallel to H2. Then, there exists w ∈ RL such that
H1+w = H2 and e ∈ R (simply let e = p ·w+ c) such that H2 = {z ∈ RL : p · z = e}.
That is, we may assume that q = p and c 6= d. Also, Ω3 = Ω∩{z ∈ RL : d ≤ p·z ≤ c}.
For all η ∈ [0, 1], consider Cη = Ω ∩ {z ∈ RL : d ≤ p · z ≤ ηc + (1 − η)d}. Clearly,
λ(C0) = 0 and λ(C1) ≥ λ(Ω3). Furthermore, by Lemma 3, the function η 7→ λ(Cη) is
continuous and so there is η∗ such that λ(Cη∗) = τ({a1})−λ(Ω1). Define Ω˜ = Ω1∪Cη∗ .
One easily sees that both Ω˜ and Ω \ Ω˜ are convex.
Finally, suppose that H1 is not parallel to H2. This implies L ≥ 2 and so, by
Lemma 9, they intersect, say at w. For each η ∈ [0, 1], we consider a hyperplane
Hη = {z ∈ RL : qη · z = dη} defined by setting qη = ηp + (1 − η)q and dη = qη · w.
Then, it follows that w ∈ Hη and that
Ω ∩ {z ∈ RL : q · z ≥ d} ∩ {z ∈ RL : qη · z ≤ dη} ⊆M.
The last claim above can be established as follows: Let z ∈ Ω ∩ {z ∈ RL : q · z ≥
d} ∩ {z ∈ RL : qη · z ≤ dη}. To show that z ∈M , it is enough to show that p · z ≤ c.
Since qη · z ≤ dη, p · w = c and q · w = d (since w ∈ H1 ∩H2), then
ηp · z + (1− η)q · z = qη · z ≤ dη = ηp · w + (1− η)q · w = ηc+ (1− η)d.
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Therefore,
p · z = ηp · z + (1− η)q · z + (1− η)(p · z − q · z)
≤ ηc+ (1− η)d+ (1− η)(p · z − q · z)
= (1− η)p · z + ηc+ (1− η)(d− q · z)
≤ (1− η)p · z + ηc.
(35)
Hence, ηp · z ≤ ηc and so p · z ≤ c since η > 0. It follows that Ω ∩ {z ∈ RL : q · z ≥
d} ∩ {z ∈ RL : qη · z ≤ dη} ⊆M .
Then, define
Cη = Ω ∩ {z ∈ RL : q · z ≥ d} ∩ {z ∈ RL : qη · z ≤ dη}.
We have that C0 = Ω∩H2 and so λ(C0) = 0. Also, C1 =M and so λ(C1) = λ(Ω3) > 0.
Furthermore, by Lemma 3, the function η 7→ λ(Cη) is continuous and so there is η∗
such that λ(Cη∗) = τ({a1}) − λ(Ω1). Define C = Cη∗ ∩ Ω3. Then, λ(C) = λ(Cη∗).
This follows because
Cη∗ \ C ⊆ (Ω \ Ω3) ∩ {z : q · z ≥ d} ∩ {z : p · z ≤ c}
⊆ {z : q · z = d} ∪ {z : p · z = c},
(36)
and λ({z : q · z = d}) = λ({z : p · z = c}) = 0.
Finally, define Ω˜ = Ω1 ∪ C. Then, claims 1 and 2 below imply that both Ω˜ and
Ω \ Ω˜ are convex.
Claim 1 The set Ω˜ is convex.
Proof. Since both Ω1 and C are convex, it is enough to show that if x ∈ Ω1,
y ∈ C and α ∈ (0, 1) then z = αx+(1−α)y ∈ Ω˜. By the convexity of {ω : Uω(a1, τ) ≥
Uω(a2, τ)}, it follows that z ∈ Ω1 ∪ Ω3. If z ∈ Ω1, then z ∈ Ω˜. If z ∈ Ω3, then also
z ∈ {w : q · w ≥ d}. Since x ∈ Ω1, then p · x ≤ c and q · x ≤ d, and so qη∗ · x ≤ dη∗ .
Since qη∗ · y ≤ dη∗ , it follows that qη∗ · z ≤ dη∗ and so z ∈ C ⊆ Ω˜.
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Claim 2 The set Ω \ Ω˜ is convex.
Proof. Note first that
Ω \ Ω˜ = Ω2 ∪ (Ω3 ∩ {z : q · z ≥ d} ∩ {z : qη∗ · z > dη∗}).
This is shown as follows: let D = Ω3∩{z : q · z ≥ d}∩{z : qη∗ · z > dη∗}. If z ∈ Ω\ Ω˜,
then z ∈ Ω2 ∪ Ω3. If z ∈ Ω3, then q · z ≥ d, and so qη∗ · z > dη∗ , since z ∈ Ω \ Ω˜.
Hence, z ∈ D. Conversely, if z ∈ Ω2 ∪ D, then either z ∈ Ω2 or z ∈ D. In the first
case, then z 6∈ Ω1 ∪Ω3 and so z 6∈ Ω˜. In the second case, then z 6∈ Ω1 and also z 6∈ C.
Since both Ω2 and D are convex, it is enough to show that if x ∈ Ω2, y ∈ D and
α ∈ (0, 1) then z = αx + (1 − α)y ∈ Ω2 ∪ D. By the convexity of {ω : Uω(a2, τ) ≥
Uω(a1, τ)}, it follows that z ∈ Ω2 ∪ Ω3. If z ∈ Ω2, then z ∈ Ω2 ∪D. If z ∈ Ω3, then
also z ∈ {w : q ·w ≥ d}. Since x ∈ Ω2, then p ·x ≥ c and q ·x ≥ d, and so qη∗ ·x ≥ dη∗ .
Since qη∗ · y > dη∗ , it follows that qη∗ · z > dη∗ and so z ∈ D ⊆ Ω2 ∪D = Ω \ Ω˜.
This completes the proof.
5 Behavioral Conformity in Induced Games with
a Continuum of Players
So far we have been able to establish behavioral conformity in a strong sense by
considering dispersed induced anonymous games. One can think of these games as
games in which players are named according to their attribute. Furthermore, only a
subset of (at most) measure zero of players have the same attribute, which makes it
easier to partition the attribute set into societies.
The difficulty in establishing behavioral conformity in induced games is that a
positive measure of players may have the same attribute. Therefore, it may be im-
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possible to have them play the same action and to guarantee, at the same time, that
the total measure of those playing that action is equal to a given value.
Nevertheless, it may happen that only a subset of measure zero of players have the
same attribute. In this case, we obtain the following existence result as a consequence
of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 Let G = ([0, 1], `, α,Ω, U,A) be a dispersed induced game with a con-
tinuum of players such that U(Ω) is quasi-intermediate. Then, there exists a Nash
equilibrium of G displaying strong behavioral conformity.
Proof. Let λ = `◦α−1 and let h : Ω→ A be a Nash equilibrium of G˜ = (λ,Ω, U,A)
displaying strong behavioral conformity. Let {Ck}Kk=1 be such that h−1(ak) = Ck,
where {a1, . . . , aK} = {a ∈ A : h−1(a) 6= ∅}.
Define f : [0, 1]→ A by f = h ◦ α. Then, f−1(ak) = α−1(h−1(ak)) = α−1(Ck) for
all k = 1, . . . , K and so f displays strong behavioral conformity.
Furthermore, f is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, let t ∈ [0, 1] and ω ∈ Ω be such that
α(t) = ω. Since, λ◦h−1 = (`◦α−1)◦h−1 = `◦f−1 and Uω(h(ω), λ◦h−1) ≥ Uω(a, λ◦h−1)
for all a ∈ A, then
Uα(t)(f(t), ` ◦ f−1) = Uω(h(ω), λ ◦ h−1) ≥ Uω(a, λ ◦ h−1) = Uα(t)(a, ` ◦ f−1) (37)
for all a ∈ A, and so, f is a Nash equilibrium.
When ` ◦ α−1 is not absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure,
there may fail to exist a Nash equilibrium of G displaying strong behavioral confor-
mity. A simple example is obtained by letting Ω = [0, 2], α(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, 1],
A = {b1, b2} and
Uω(a, µ) =
 1− µ1 if a = b1,ωµ1 if a = b2 (38)
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for all ω ∈ [0, 2]. Note that if f is a Nash equilibrium of G, then ` ◦ f−1({b1}) = 1/2.
Hence, it is impossible to partition Ω into two sets C1 and C2 in such a way that
f−1(b1) = α−1(C1). In fact, if 1 ∈ C1, then f−1(b1) = [0, 1] and ` ◦ f−1({b1}) = 1 6=
1/2, while if 1 ∈ C2, then f−1(b1) = ∅ and ` ◦ f−1({b1}) = 0 6= 1/2.
Nevertheless, in this game there is a Nash equilibrium displaying behavioral con-
formity. In fact, letting C1 = [0, 1] and C2 = (1, 2], then 1 belongs to neither int(C1)
nor to int(C2), implying that all strategies f satisfying ` ◦ f−1({b1}) = 1/2 are Nash
equilibria displaying behavioral conformity.
The above conclusion can be extended beyond this example, as shown by the
following result.
Theorem 3 Let G = ([0, 1], `, α,Ω, U,A) be an induced game with a continuum of
players such that U(Ω) is quasi-intermediate. Then, for every Nash equilibrium g
of G, there exists a Nash equilibrium f of G that displays behavioral conformity and
satisfies ` ◦ f−1 = ` ◦ g−1. In particular, there exists a Nash equilibrium that displays
behavioral conformity.
Theorem 3 shows that players’ preferences being quasi-intermediate is a sufficient
condition for the existence of Nash equilibria displaying behavioral conformity in
games with a continuum of players. In fact, every Nash equilibrium of such a game
can be modified in order to produce another Nash equilibrium that displays behavioral
conformity and induces the same distribution over actions. Hence, despite the fact
that behavioral conformity is weaker here than in dispersed induced anonymous games
with quasi-intermediate preferences, it is still the case that every distribution on A
induced by a Nash equilibrium is consistent with behavioral conformity.
The idea of the proof is illustrated by the following examples. The first consists
of the example given above. In this example, C1 = [0, 1] = {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(b1, ` ◦ f−1) ≥
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Uω(b2, ` ◦ g−1)} = [0, 1] and C2 = (1, 2] = {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(b2, ` ◦ f−1) > Uω(b1, ` ◦ g−1)}.
Hence, one easily concludes that int(Ci) ⊆ {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(bi, ` ◦ g−1) > Uω(bj, ` ◦ g−1)}
for all i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i. Hence, defining f(t) = ai if α(t) ∈ int(Ci), we only need
to divide the remaining players (i.e., those in [0, 1] \ α−1(∪2i=1int(Ci))) between the
two actions in such a way that ` ◦ f−1 = 1/2.
The conclusion that int(Ci) ⊆ {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(bi, ` ◦ g−1) > Uω(bj, ` ◦ g−1)} for all
i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i can be established in general using Lemma 4 below. It states that
for any pair of actions such that, for some attributes one action is preferred, while for
others they are indifferent, we can easily determine whether a player with an attribute
in the interior of Ω strictly prefers one of them or whether he is indifferent between
them. In fact, we simply need to determine the position of his attribute relative to
a hyperplane. Despite the fact that we assume that preferences are merely quasi-
intermediate and the attribute space is merely convex, this lemma can be proven
using the same argument as in the proof of the Proposition in Grandmont (1978).
However, since we do not assume that Ω is open, our conclusions apply only to points
in the interior of Ω.
Lemma 4 Let a, a¯ ∈ A, µ ∈ M and suppose that Ω ⊆ RL is convex, U(Ω) is quasi-
intermediate and there exist ω˜, ωˆ ∈ Ω such that Uω˜(a, µ) > Uω˜(a¯, µ) and Uωˆ(a, µ) =
Uωˆ(a¯, µ).
Then, there exist q ∈ RL, q 6= 0, and c ∈ R such that for all ω ∈ int(Ω), q · ω > c
when Uω(a, µ) > Uω(a¯, µ), q · ω = c when Uω(a, µ) = Uω(a¯, µ), and q · ω < c when
Uω(a, µ) < Uω(a¯, µ).
The second example we consider is again of a trivial induced game in which all
players are indifferent between all actions. As in Section 3, the pregame is defined by
Ω = [0, 1], A = {a1, a2} and Uω(a, µ) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω, a ∈ A and µ ∈ M. Finally,
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define
α(t) =

0 if t ∈ [0, 1/4],
8/10 if t ∈ (1/4, 1/2),
9/10 if t ∈ [1/2, 3/4) and
1 if t ∈ [3/4, 1]
(39)
Suppose that g is a Nash equilibrium of this game such that ` ◦ g−1({a1}) = 2/3.
Then, we can define C1 = [0, 9/10] and C2 = (9/10, 1]. The important property
guaranteed by this choice is that `◦α−1(int(C1)) = `((1/4, 1/2)) = 1/4 < `◦g−1({a1})
and ` ◦ α−1(int(C2)) = `(∅) = 0 < ` ◦ g−1({a2}). Hence, defining f(t) = ai if
α(t) ∈ int(Ci) for all i = 1, 2, we still leave f undefined in the set [0, 1/4] ∪ [1/2, 1].
This set of players can then be divided in a way that those in it playing a1 have
a measure of 5/12 = ` ◦ g−1({a1}) − ` ◦ α−1(int(C1)). For example, we can define
f(t) = a1 for all t ∈ [7/12, 1] and f(t) = a2 for all t ∈ [0, 1/4] ∪ [1/2, 7/12].
More generally, we use the following lemma when there are several actions which
are indifferent for all players. Lemma 5 is similar to Lemma 1 and considers the case
when λ may fail to be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure,
and, in fact, may have atoms.
Lemma 5 Let C ⊆ RL be a bounded, measurable, convex set and c1, c2, . . . , ck ∈ R
be such that ci ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and λ(int(C)) ≤
∑k
i=1 ci ≤ λ(C).
Then, there exists a convex partition {Ci}ki=1 of C satisfying λ(int(Ci)) ≤ ci for
all i = 1, . . . , k.
We can use Lemma 5 in the above example by considering C = Ω, L = 1, c1 =
` ◦ g−1({a1}) = 2/3 and c2 = ` ◦ g−1({a2}) = 1/3.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let g be a Nash equilibrium of G. Let τ = ` ◦ g−1 and
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consider the partition {Ca}a∈A(g)\Ai ∪{D[a]}a∈Ai of Ω defined in the proof of Theorem
1.
We start by establishing a property of points in the interior of Ca and D[a], for
a ∈ A(g) \ Ai and a ∈ Ai respectively.
Let a ∈ A(g) \ Ai and ω ∈ int(Ca). Then, Uω(a, τ) > Uω(a¯, τ) for all a¯ ∈ A,
a¯ 6= a, i.e., int(Ca) ⊆ Sa. In fact, suppose, in order to reach a contradiction, that
Uω(ai, τ) = Uω(aj, τ) for some j > i. Since ai 6∼ aj, then there exists ωˆ ∈ Ω such
that either Uωˆ(ai, τ) > Uωˆ(aj, τ) or Uωˆ(aj, τ) > Uωˆ(ai, τ). In both cases, it follows
from Lemma 4 that there exist q ∈ RL, q 6= 0 and c ∈ R such that for all ω¯ ∈ int(Ω),
q · ω¯ > c if Uω¯(ai, τ) > Uω¯(aj, τ), q · ω¯ = c if Uω¯(ai, τ) = Uω¯(aj, τ) and q · ω¯ < c
if Uω¯(ai, τ) < Uω¯(aj, τ). Since ω ∈ int(Ci) ⊆ int(Ω), then q · ω = c and so there
exists ω¯ ∈ int(Ci) such that q · ω¯ < c. This implies that Uω¯(ai, τ) < Uω¯(aj, τ), a
contradiction to ω¯ ∈ Ci.
In this case, define
f(t) = a if α(t) ∈ int(Ca). (40)
Since int(Ca) ⊆ Sa, then ` ◦ α−1(int(Ca)) ≤ ` ◦ g−1({a}).
We now turn to actions in Ai. Let a¯ ∈ Ai. A similar argument to the one above
shows that if ω ∈ int(D[a¯]), then ω ∈ S[a¯]. Hence, defining
ca = `({t ∈ [0, 1] : α(t) ∈ S[a¯] and g(t) = a}) (41)
for all a ∈ [a¯], it follows that
` ◦ α−1(int(D[a¯])) ≤ ` ◦ α−1(S[a¯]) =
∑
a∈[a¯]
ca ≤ ` ◦ α−1(D[a¯]). (42)
By Lemma 5, there exists a convex partition {Ca}a∈[a¯] of D[a¯] such that ` ◦
α−1(int(Ca)) ≤ ca. Define, again, f(t) = a if α(t) ∈ int(Ca) and note that ` ◦
α−1(int(Ca)) ≤ ` ◦ g−1({a}) since ca ≤ ` ◦ g−1({a}).
29
Since Ω =
(∪a∈A(g)\AiCa) ∪ (∪a∈AiD[a]) = ∪a∈A(g)Ca, Ca is convex and f(t) = a if
α(t) ∈ int(Ca) for all a ∈ A(g), {Ca}a∈A(g) is our desired convex partition.
To complete the proof, we need to specify f on Ω\∪a∈A(g)int(Ca) so that `◦f−1 =
` ◦ g−1. This will follow from the Bolloba´s-Varopoulos Theorem (see Khan and Sun
(1995, Theorem 4)). Indeed, define Z = [0, 1] \ α−1(∪aint(Ca)), Ta = ∩a′∈A{t ∈ Z :
Uα(t)(a, τ) ≥ Uα(t)(a′, τ)} and θa = ` ◦ g−1({a})− ` ◦α−1(int(Ca)) ≥ 0. Since we have
that `(∪a∈BTa) ≥
∑
a∈B θa for all (finite) subsets B of A, it follows that there exists
a disjoint family of measurable sets {Fa}a∈A such that Fa ⊆ Ta and `(Fa) = θa for
all a ∈ A. Thus, define f(t) = a if t ∈ Fa. Hence, f is a Nash equilibrium of G
displaying behavioral conformity.
6 Behavioral Conformity in Large Finite Games
In this section we consider the case of games with a large, but finite, number of
players. Since we can understand games with a continuum of players as the limit of
large finite games (see, for example, Green (1984), Housman (1988) and Carmona
(2004)), one expects that properties that hold for Nash equilibria in games with a
continuum of players will also hold in approximate equilibria for large finite games.
In fact, we use our previous results for dispersed induced anonymous games and for
induced games to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium displaying (strong)
behavioral conformity in all sufficiently large finite games.
Theorem 4 states that all sufficiently large finite games with a one-dimensional
attribute space and an injective attribute function have an approximate equilibrium
displaying strong behavioral conformity.
Theorem 4 Let G = (ϕ,Ω, U, A) be a pregame such that Ω ⊆ R and U(Ω) is equicon-
tinuous and quasi-intermediate. Then, for all ε > 0 there is N ∈ N with the following
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property:
For all n ≥ N , every injective induced game Gn = ((Tn, νn),Ω, U, A, α) with n
players has an ε – equilibrium that displays strong behavioral conformity.
The assumption that the attribute function is injective plays in Theorem 4 a role
similar to the one that the dispersed assumption plays in Theorem 1. In fact, both
guarantee that there is a small “number” of players with the same attribute.
The relationship between Theorems 1 and 4 is strengthened by noticing that the
latter implies the former. This is illustrated by the following example. Let Gn be such
that Ω, A and U are as defined in the first example of Section 5, and let α(t) = 2t/n
for all t = 1, . . . , n. To this induced game with n players, we associate a dispersed
anonymous game defined as follows: for all t ∈ Tn, let Ωt be an interval containing
ωt = 2t/n. Then, let g : Ω → R be defined by g(ω) = 1/n`(Ωt) if ω ∈ Ωt and define
a measure λ in Ω by λ(E) =
∫
E
gd` for all measurable E ⊆ Ω. In this example, we
can let Ω1 = [0, 2/n] and Ωt = (2(t− 1)/n, 2t/n] for all t > 1. Hence, g is constantly
equal to 1/2 and λ = `/2.
Since G˜ = (λ,Ω, U, A) is a dispersed anonymous game, then it has a Nash equi-
librium f : Ω → A satisfying strong behavioral conformity. In this example, we can
let C1 = [0, 1], C2 = (1, 2] and f be such that f(ω) = b1 if and only if ω ∈ C1. Then,
we can easily check that the strategy f ◦α : Tn → A is a Nash equilibrium of Gn, and
clearly displays strong behavioral conformity.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let ε > 0. Since U(Ω) is equicontinuous, let δ > 0 be
such that
|Uω(a, τ)− Uω(a, µ)| < ε/3 (43)
whenever ||τ − µ|| < δ, τ, µ ∈M, a ∈ A and ω ∈ Ω. Finally, let N ∈ N be such that
|A|/n < δ whenever n ≥ N .
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Let n ≥ N and Gn = ((Tn, νn),Ω, U, A, α) be an injective induced game with n
players. Let α(Tn) = {ω1, . . . , ωn} and partition Ω into n intervals {Ωi}ni=1 such that
ωi ∈ Ωi and `(Ωi) > 0.
Define g : Ω→ R by
g(ω) =
1
n`(Ωi)
(44)
if ω ∈ Ωi and a measure λ in Ω by
λ(E) =
∫
E
gd` (45)
for all measurable subsets E of Ω. Then, λ(Ωi) = 1/n and λ is non-atomic.
By Theorem 1, it follows that there exists a Nash equilibrium f of G = (Ω, λ, U,A)
in which all players best-reply and a partition {Ck}Kk=1 of Ω into disjoint convex
sets satisfying f−1(ak) = Ck for all ak ∈ A such that f−1(ak) 6= ∅ (i.e., A(f) =
{a1, . . . , aK}).
An important step in the argument is provided by the following lemma. Let
X ⊆ R be convex, B = {Bi}Ni=1 be a collection of pairwise disjoint convex subsets of
X and C = {Cj}Kj=1 be a convex partition of X (i.e., Cj is convex for all j = 1, . . . , K).
Define
ρ(X,B, C) = |{i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : Bi ⊆ Cj for some j ∈ {1, . . . , K}}| . (46)
Lemma 6 For all convex subsets X of R and all N,K ∈ N, if |B| = N and |C| = K,
then ρ(X,B, C) ≥ N −K + 1.
It follows by Lemma 6 that for at least n − K + 1 sets in {Ωi}ni=1, there exists
k ∈ {1, . . . , K} such that Ωi ⊆ Ck.
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}, let τi,j = λ({ω ∈ Ωi : f(ω) = aj}) and
τj =
∑n
i=1 τi,j for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Clearly, τj = λ ◦ f−1({aj}). Note
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that if Ωi ⊆ Ck, then f(ω) = ak for all ω ∈ Ωi. So, in this case, τi,k = λ(Ωi) = 1/n
and τi,j = λ(∅) = 0 if j 6= k.
Let ν˜n = νn ◦α−1 and µ = ν˜n ◦ f−1. Note that if Ωi ⊆ Ck, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
1 ≤ k ≤ K, then f(ω) = ak for all ω ∈ Ωi, implying that
µi,j = ν˜n({ω ∈ ωi : f(ω) = aj}) =
 1/n if j = k0 if j 6= k. (47)
Define
Pk = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : Ωi ⊆ Ck}
and P = ∪Kk=1Pk. We claim that |τj − µj| ≤ |A|/n for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |A|: if i ∈ P , then
µi,j = 1/n = τi,j if i ∈ Pj and µi,j = 0 = τi,j if j ∈ Pk, k 6= j; therefore,
|τj − µj| ≤
∑
i6∈P
|τi,j − µi,j| ≤ 1
n
(n− (n−K + 1)) = K − 1
n
<
|A|
n
< δ,
since |τi,j − µi,j| ≤ 1/n for all i and j. Thus, ||τ − µ|| < δ.
Since f is a Nash equilibrium in which all players best-reply, it follows that
Uωi(f(ωi), τ) ≥ Uωi(a, τ) (48)
for all a ∈ A and 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ A, we obtain
Uωi(f(ωi), νn ◦ f−1) = Uωi(f(ωi), µ) > Uωi(f(ωi), τ)−
ε
3
≥ Uωi(a, τ)−
ε
3
> Uωi(a, µ)−
2ε
3
> Uωi(a, νn ◦ (f \ωi a)−1)− ε,
(49)
where the first and third inequalities follow from (50), the second from (48) and the
last from Lemma 11. Therefore, f ◦ α is an ε – equilibrium of Gn.
Similarly to the case of induced games with a continuum of players, if the at-
tribute function is not injective, then there is no hope of guaranteing the existence
of approximate equilibria displaying strong behavioral conformity in sufficiently large
games. For instance, if we modify the example in this section so that α(t) = 1 for
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all t ∈ Tn, then the resulting game has no approximate equilibrium displaying strong
behavioral conformity.
Nevertheless, we can use Theorem 3 to establish the existence of approximate
equilibria displaying behavioral conformity in all sufficiently large finite games.
Theorem 5 Let G = (Ω, U, A) be a pregame such that U(Ω) is equicontinuous and
quasi-intermediate. Then, for all ε > 0 there is N ∈ N with the following property:
For all n ≥ N , every induced game Gn = (Tn, νn,Ω, U, A, α) with n players has
an ε – equilibrium that displays behavioral conformity.
Proof. Let ε > 0 and let η > 0 be such that 4η < ε. Since U(Ω) is equicontinuous,
let δ > 0 be such that
||Uω(a, τ)− Uω(a, µ)|| < η/3 (50)
whenever ||τ − µ|| < δ, τ, µ ∈M, a ∈ A and ω ∈ Ω. Finally, let N ∈ N be such that
2|A|2/n < δ and |A|/n < η whenever n ≥ N .
Let n ≥ N and Gn = ((Tn, νn),Ω, α, U,A) be an induced game with n players.
Define I1 = [0, 1/n], Ii = ((i− 1)/n, i/n] for all i = 2, . . . , n and consider the induced
game G˜ = (([0, 1], `),Ω, α˜, U,A) defined by α˜(t) = α(i) if t ∈ Ii. That is, players
t ∈ I1 have payoff function Uα(1), players t ∈ I2 have payoff function Uα(2), and so
on. Then, G˜ has a Nash equilibrium f displaying behavioral conformity by Theorem
3. Let {a1, . . . , aK} = A(f) and {Ck}Kk=1 be such that α(t) ∈ int(Ck) implies that
f(t) = ak.
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ K, let τi,j = `({t ∈ Ii : f(t) = aj}) and
τj =
∑n
i=1 τi,j for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The equilibrium distribution can be
represented in the following way:
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τ1,1 τ1,2 · · · τ1,K
τ2,1 τ2,2 τ2,K
...
τn,1 τn,2 τn,K
τ1 τ2 τK
Note that
∑K
j=1 τi,j = 1/n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Furthermore, since f is a Nash equilib-
rium, τi,j > 0 implies that
Uα(i)(aj, ` ◦ f−1) ≥ Uα(i)(a, ` ◦ f−1) (51)
for all a ∈ A.
Let E = {e1, . . . , eK} denote the standard basis of RK and define
Si =
{
1
n
ej : τi,j > 0
}
.
Then, we have that (τi,1, . . . , τi,K) ∈ co(Si) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, since
(τi,1, . . . , τi,K) =
∑
j:τi,j>0
τi,jej =
∑
j:τi,j>0
nτi,j
ej
n
, (52)
nτi,j ≥ 0 for all j and
∑
j:τi,j>0
nτi,j = 1. This implies that
(τ1, . . . , τK) ∈ co
(
n∑
i=1
Si
)
=
n∑
i=1
co(Si), (53)
and so by the Shapley-Folkman Theorem (see Rashid (1983)), it follows that there
are n points (αi,1, . . . , αi,K) ∈ co(Si), i = 1, . . . , n, such that
(τ1, . . . , τK) =
n∑
i=1
(αi,1, . . . , αi,K) (54)
and
|{i : (αi,1, . . . , αi,K) 6∈ Si}| ≤ K = |A(f)|. (55)
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Let P = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : nαi ∈ E}. Define a pure strategy g as follows: if
i ∈ P , let ej be such that nαi = ej and define g(i) = aj; if i 6∈ P , choose 1 ≤ j ≤ K
such that τi,j > 0 and define g(i) = aj. It then follows from inequality (51) that
Uα(i)(g(i), ` ◦ f−1) ≥ Uα(i)(a, ` ◦ f−1) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ A.
It follows by construction that g displays behavioral conformity. Indeed, if i ∈
{1, . . . , n} is such that α(i) ∈ int(Cj) for some 1 ≤ j ≤ K, then for all t ∈ Ii,
α˜(t) = α(i) ∈ int(Cj). Therefore, f(t) = aj for all t ∈ Ii and so τi,j = 1. Hence,
Si = co(Si) = {ej/n}, nαi = ej and g(i) = aj. In conclusion, if i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is such
that α(i) ∈ int(Cj), then g(i) = aj.
Let 1 ≤ j ≤ K and let 1{g=aj} : {1, . . . , n} → {0, 1} denote the function defined
by 1{g=aj}(i) = 1 if g(i) = aj and 1{g=aj} = 0 if g(i) 6= aj. Then we can write
νn ◦ g−1(aj) =
∑
i∈P
αi,j +
1
n
∑
i 6∈P
1{g=aj}(i). (56)
Hence,
|` ◦ f−1(aj)− νn ◦ g−1(aj)| = 1
n
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i6∈P
(
nαi,j − 1{g=aj}(i)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Kn (57)
and so ||` ◦ f−1 − νn ◦ g−1|| ≤ K/n < δ/2.
By Lemma 11, it follows that
||` ◦ f−1 − νn ◦ (g−1 \i a)|| ≤ ||` ◦ f−1 − νn ◦ g−1||+ ||νn ◦ g−1 − νn ◦ (g−1 \i a)||
≤ δ
2
+
1
n
< δ,
(58)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ A.
Hence, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ A, we obtain
Uα(i)(g(i), νn ◦ g−1) > Uα(i)(g(i), ` ◦ f−1)− ε
2
≥ Uα(i)(a, ` ◦ f−1)− ε
2
> Uα(i)(a, νn ◦ (g−1 \i a))− ε.
(59)
Therefore, g is a ε – equilibrium of Gn.
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7 Relation with Wooders et al.
Despite the fact that we have closely followedWooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006),
we have presented the model and stated our assumptions in a different way. In this
section, we show that we are considering the same model and that our assumptions
are weaker.
In light of Subsection 2.4, we only discuss their model under the assumption that
there is only one crowding type. In this case, let Ω = [0, 1]L for some L ∈ N. Let W
be the space of all non-negative, real-valued functions in Ω×A with finite support. A
WCS – pregame is a triple (Ω, h, A), where h is a non-negative, real-valued function in
Ω×A×W . We shall prove that every WCS – pregame satisfying the large game and
within type anonymity of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) defines a uniformly
continuous pregame that induces the same n-player games.
Let G˜ = (Ω, h, A) be a WCS – pregame satisfying the large game property. Recall
that we can identify M with the standard unit ∆ in R|A|. Define ∆q = ∆ ∩ Q and,
for all a ∈ A, ∆a = {x ∈ ∆ ∩ Q : xa > 0}. For all ω ∈ Ω and µ ∈ ∆ ∩ Q, define
wω,µ ∈ W by
wω,µ(ω¯, a) =
 µa if ω¯ = ω,0 otherwise. (60)
Also, define U˜hω : A×∆ ∩Q→ R by U˜hω(a, µ) = h(ω, a, wω,µ).
Lemma 7 For all ω ∈ Ω and a ∈ A, the function µ 7→ U˜ω(a, µ) is uniformly contin-
uous in ∆a.
Proof. Let ω ∈ Ω, a ∈ A and ε > 0. Let δ > 0 be as in the definition of the global
interaction property and let µ, µ′ ∈ ∆a be such that ||µ− µ′||1 =
∑
a¯∈A |µa¯− µ′a¯| < δ.
If µ = (pa¯/q)a¯∈A and µ′ = (p′a¯/q
′)a¯∈A for some pa¯, p′a¯, q, q
′ ∈ N for all a¯ ∈ A, then
µ = (q′pa¯/qq′)a¯∈A and µ′ = (qp′a¯/qq
′)a¯∈A.
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Consider a game with n = qq′ players and α(t) = ω for all t ∈ Tn. Let f and
g be strategies such that νn ◦ f−1 = µ, νn ◦ g−1 = µ′ and f(1) = g(1) = a. Since
α is constant, then ρα(f, g) = ||νn ◦ f−1 − νn ◦ g−1|| = ||µ − µ′|| < δ. Furthermore,
wω,µ = wα,f and wω,µ′ = wα,g. Hence, it follows by the global interaction property
that
|U˜hω(a, µ)− U˜hω(a, µ′)| = |h(ω, a, wα,f )− h(ω, a, wα,g)| < ε
and so µ 7→ U˜ω(a, µ) is uniformly continuous in ∆a.
Since the set ∪a∈A({a}×∆a) is dense in A×∆, it follows that U˜hω can be extended
to a uniformly continuous function Uhω in A×∆ for all ω ∈ Ω (see DePree and Swartz
(1988, Lemma 14, p. 279)). Hence, Uhω ∈ U for all ω ∈ Ω and so indeed we have a
function Uh : Ω→ U .
Lemma 8 The function Uh is uniformly continuous.
Proof. Let ε > 0 and let δ > 0 be as in the definition of the continuity in attributes
property and corresponding to ε/2. Let ω, ω′ ∈ Ω be such that ||ω − ω′|| < δ.
Let a ∈ A and µ ∈ ∆a. Then, µ = (pa¯/n)a¯∈A for some n and pa¯ ∈ N for all a¯ ∈ A.
Consider two n-player games, one with α(t) = ω and the other with α′(t) = ω′ for
all t ∈ Tn. Let f be a strategy such that νn ◦ f−1 = µ and f(1) = a. Then, by the
continuity in attributes property, it follows that
|Uhω(a, µ)− Uhω′(a, µ)| = |U˜hω(a, µ)− U˜hω′(a, µ)| = |h(ω, a, wα,f )− h(ω′, a, wα,f )| < ε/2.
Since ∪a∈A{a}×∆a is dense in A×∆ and both Uω and Uω′ are continuous, it follows
that
||Uω − Uω′|| = sup
(a,µ)∈A×∆
|Uhω(a, µ)− Uhω′(a, µ)| ≤ ε/2 < ε.
Hence, U is uniformly continuous.
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It follows from Lemmas 7 and 8 that every WCS – pregame with a large game
property induces a uniformly continuous pregame.
Theorem 6 If G˜ = (Ω, h, A) is a WCS – pregame satisfying the large game property,
then G = (Ω, Uh, A) is a uniformly continuous pregame. Hence, Uh(Ω) is a compact
subset of U .
We shall prove next that if G˜ = (Ω, h, A) satisfies the large game property and
within-type anonymity, then G = (Ω, Uh, A) induces the same n-player games as
G˜. In order to establish this claim, note first that for every attribute function α
and strategy f in a game with n players, the weight function wα,f relative to f is
equal to n times the distribution νn ◦ (α, f)−1 in Ω × A induced by α and f , i.e.,
wα,f (ω, a) = nνn ◦ (α, f)−1(ω, a) for all ω ∈ Ω and a ∈ A. Therefore, slightly abusing
the notation, we can write h(ω, a, wα,f ) = h(ω, a, νn ◦ (α, f)−1) for all ω ∈ Ω and
a ∈ A.
Furthermore, if G˜ satisfies within-type anonymity, then h depends only on the
distribution νn ◦ f−1 on A. Hence, there exists h˜ : Ω × A × ∆ → R such that
h(ω, a, wα,f ) = h˜(ω, a, νn ◦ f−1) for all ω ∈ Ω and a ∈ A. Letting α¯(t) = ω for all
t ∈ Tn, it follows that wω,νn◦f−1 = nνn ◦ (α¯, f)−1, and so
Uhω(a, νn ◦ f−1) = h(ω, a, νn ◦ (α¯, f)−1) = h˜(ω, a, νn ◦ f−1).
Hence, Uhα(t)(f(t), νn ◦ f−1) = h(α(t), f(t), wα,f ) for all players t ∈ Tn, strategies
f : Tn → A and attribute functions α : Tn → Ω, establishing Theorem 7
Theorem 7 If G˜ = (Ω, h, A) is a WCS – pregame satisfying both the large game prop-
erty and within-type anonymity, then G˜ and its associated pregame G = (Ω, Uh, A)
induce the same games and the same anonymous games.
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Since Theorem 3 in Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) concerns only games
induced by WCS – pregames satisfying both the within-type anonymity and the
large game property, it follows from Theorem 7 that they can be obtained simply
by using pregames. Therefore, their Theorem 3 follows from Theorem 5. In fact, if
G˜ = (Ω, h, A) is a WCS – pregame satisfying the large game property, within-type
anonymity and linearity in taste types, then G = (Ω, Uh, A) is a pregame with Uh
uniformly continuous and intermediate and Uh(Ω) compact, hence equicontinuous.
Therefore, we can conclude from Theorem 5 for all ε > 0 there is N ∈ N such
that every induced game Gn (by G˜ or, equivalently, by G) with n ≥ N players
has an ε – equilibrium that displays behavioral conformity. In conclusion, Theorem
5 extends Theorem 3 of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) by allowing more
general attribute spaces (Ω can be any convex, bounded, measurable subset of RL) and
more general preference functions (U needs only to be measurable, quasi-intermediate
and such that U(Ω) is equicontinuous).
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have approached the behavioral conformity problem of Wooders,
Cartwright, and Selten (2006) using the framework of games with a continuum of
players. This has led to some improvements of their Theorem 3, not only in terms
of weakening some of its assumptions, but also in terms of a simpler proof, able
to accommodate easily the case of multi-dimensional attributes and arbitrary finite
action spaces.
Although artificial, the case of a continuum of players is interesting even for some-
one who is only interested in games with a large but finite number of players. In fact,
as we have shown in Carmona (2004), the limit points of the approximate equilibria
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of large finite games correspond to the Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of
players. In this paper, this correspondence between Nash equilibria of games with a
continuum of players and approximate equilibria of games with a large, finite number
of players was precisely the tool we used to derive our generalization of Wooders et
al.’s Theorem 3 from our Theorem 3 pertaining to games with a continuum of players.
Furthermore, it was also used to derive our strong behavioral conformity result for
large, finite games (Theorem 4) from Theorem 1 pertaining to dispersed anonymous
games.
We conclude with a remark on the definition of behavioral conformity: Theorems
1 and 2 (and their proofs) imply that if G is an induced anonymous game satisfying
the assumptions of any of them, then G has a continuous λ – almost everywhere equi-
librium. Such equilibrium also reflects the intuitive notion of behavioral conformity,
since it implies that individuals that have similar attributes behave similarly, with
possibly the exception of a small fraction of them. With this weaker notion of behav-
ioral conformity one loses the notion of a society, but one may gain a more general
behavioral conformity result. Also, it allows us to fit some interesting examples. One
of those is the inner vs outer city behavior where cities are represented by circles: the
inner city forms a society, but not the outer city.8
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that if λ(C) = 0, then we can let C1 = C and Ci = ∅ for
all i = 2, . . . , k. Also, if ci = 0 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then we can let Ci = ∅. Therefore,
we may assume that ci > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Let x 6∈ C. By the supporting hyperplane theorem, let p ∈ RL be such that p 6= 0
8I thank Joa˜o Rosal for suggesting this example to me.
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and p · y ≤ p · x for all y ∈ C. Let d = p · x.
Consider the function m : R+ → R+ defined by
m(η) = λ(C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− η ≤ p · z ≤ d}).
One easily sees that m is continuous, m(0) = 0 and limη→∞m(η) = λ(C). Since C
is bounded, in fact, m(η¯) = λ(C) for some η¯ > 0. Hence, there is η1 > 0 such that
m(η1) = c1, and so define C1 = C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− η1 ≤ p · z ≤ d}, which is a convex
subset of C.
Furthermore, there is η2 > η1 such that m(η2) = c1 + c2. Then, defining C2 =
C∩{z ∈ RL : d−η2 ≤ p·z < d−η1}, we see that λ(C1)+λ(C2) = λ(C1∪C2) = c1+c2,
which implies that λ(C2) = c2.
Let i ≥ 3 and assume that we have found {ηj}i−1j=1 such that ηj > ηj−1 and
cj = λ(C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− ηj ≤ p · z < d− ηj−1}) for all j = 2, . . . , i− 1. Then there
is ηi > ηi−1 such that m(ηi) =
∑i
j=1 cj. Then, defining Ci = C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d − ηi ≤
p · z < d− ηi−1}, we see that
∑i
j=1 λ(Ci) = λ(∪ij=1Cj) =
∑i
j=1 ci, which implies that
λ(Ci) = ci. Clearly, Ci is a convex subset of C.
Finally, let Ck = C ∩ {z ∈ RL : p · z < d − ηk−1}, a convex subset of C. Clearly,
∪ki=1Ci = C∩{z ∈ RL : p ·z ≤ d} = C. Reasoning as above, one sees that λ(Ck) = ck.
Proof of Lemma 2. We may assume that B := {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a, µ) = Uω(a¯, µ)}
is non-empty, since otherwise this result is trivial. For concreteness assume that
C := {ω ∈ Ω : Uω(a, µ) > Uω(a¯, µ)} is non-empty and let ω′ ∈ C
By the separating hyperplane theorem, there exist q ∈ RL and c ∈ R such that
q 6= 0 and q · ω˜ ≥ c ≥ q · ω for all ω˜ ∈ C and all ω ∈ B.
Let ω ∈ B. Then, q ·ω ≤ c. Let {αk}∞k=1 be a sequence in (0, 1) such that αk → 1
and consider ωk = αkω + (1− αk)ω′. Then, ωk ∈ C and so q · ωk ≥ c. Since ωk → ω,
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it follows that q · ω ≥ c. Hence, q · ω = c. So, let qa,a¯ = q and ca,a¯ = c.
Lemma 9 Let n ≥ 2 and Hi ⊆ Rn, i = 1, 2, be two hyperplanes. If H1 is not parallel
to H2, then they intersect (i.e., H1 ∩H2 6= ∅).
Proof. Let Li be the subspace of Rn parallel to Hi, i = 1, 2 and recall that
dim(Li) = n − 1 (see Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 1.2, p. 4)). Then, L1 6= L2,
since otherwise H1 and H2 would be parallel. Hence, there exists w ∈ L2 \ L1, since
otherwise L2 ⊆ L1, which together with dim(L1) = dim(L2), would imply L1 = L2
(see Friedberg, Insel, and Spence (1997, Theorem 1.11, p. 49)).
It then follows that L1 + L2 = Rn: if w ∈ L2 \ L1 and {w1, . . . , wn−1} is a
basis for L1, then span({w1, . . . , wn−1, w}) = Rn since {w1, . . . , wn−1, w} is linearly
independent by Friedberg, Insel, and Spence (1997, Theorem 1.8, p. 41). Further-
more, {w1, . . . , wn−1, w} ⊆ L1 ∪ L2, which implies that span({w1, . . . , wn−1, w}) ⊆
span(L1 ∪ L2) = L1 + L2. So, Rn ⊆ L1 + L2, and, of course, L1 + L2 ⊆ Rn.
Since L2 = −L2, then L1 − L2 = RL. Let ai ∈ RL, i = 1, 2, be such that
Hi = Li + ai. Let x1 ∈ L1 and x2 ∈ L2 be such x1 − x2 = a2 − a1. So, defining
x = x1 + a1 = x2 + a2, it follows that x ∈ H1 ∩H2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let {ηk} be such that ηk ↘ η. We claim that λ(Cηk) ↘
λ(Cη). We start by establishing that {Cηk} decreases: since ηk ↘ η, it follows that
ηk > 0 for all k. Since q · w = d ≤ q · z and (1 − ηk+1)/ηk+1 ≥ (1 − ηk)/ηk, then if
z ∈ Cηk+1 , it follows that
p · z ≤ p · w + 1− ηk+1
ηk+1
(q · w − q · z)
≤ p · w + 1− ηk
ηk
(q · w − q · z).
(61)
Hence, ηkp · z + (1− ηk)q · z ≤ ηkp · w + (1− ηk)qw and z ∈ Cηk .
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We next show that ∩kCηk ⊆ Cη and that ∩kCηk = Cη if η > 0. If z ∈ Cη, and
η > 0, then a similar argument to the one used to establish that Cηk+1 ⊆ Cηk shows
that z ∈ Cηk for all k ∈ N. Conversely, if z ∈ ∩kCηk , then ηkp · z + (1 − ηk)q · z ≥
ηkp ·w+ (1− ηk)qw for all k, and so ηp · z + (1− η)q · z ≥ ηp ·w+ (1− η)qw. Hence,
z ∈ Cη.
Finally, we show that if η = 0, then limk λ(Cηk) = λ(Cη) = 0: We have that
C0 = Ω∩ {z : q · z = d} and so λ(C0) = 0. Since ∩kCηk ⊆ C0 and Cηk ↘ ∩kCηk then,
limk λ(Cηk) = λ(∩kCηk) ≤ λ(C0) = 0, and so limk λ(Cηk) = 0.
Similarly, we can show that if ηk ↗ η then Cηk ↗ ∪kCηk and ∪kCηk ⊆ Cη (note
that η > 0). Hence, λ(Cηk)↗ λ(∪kCηk) ≤ λ(Cη). We claim that λ(∪kCηk) = λ(Cη).
Note that it is enough to show that λ(Cη \ ∪kCηk) = 0. If z ∈ Cη \ ∪kCηk , then
qη ·z ≤ dη and qηk ·z > dηk for all k. This implies that qη ·z = dη, and so Cη \∪kCηk ⊆
{z ∈ RL : qη · z = dη}. Thus, λ(Cη \ ∪kCηk) = 0.
We have shown that both ηk ↗ η and ηk ↘ η imply that λ(Cηk) → λ(Cη). This
shows that the function η 7→ λ(Cη) is continuous.
Proof of Lemma 5. Note that if λ(C) = 0, then we can let C1 = C and Ci = ∅
for all i = 2, . . . , k. Also, if ci = 0 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then we can let Ci = ∅.
Therefore, we may assume that ci > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Let x 6∈ C. By the supporting hyperplane theorem, let p ∈ RL be such that p 6= 0
and p · y ≤ p · x for all y ∈ C. Let d = p · x+ 1.
For all η ∈ R+, define
Cη = C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− η ≤ p · z ≤ d} (62)
and define a function m : R+ → R+ by m(η) = λ(Cη).
One easily establishes the following properties of m: (1) m is increasing, (2)
limη↓η∗m(η) = m(η∗) for all η∗, (3) limη↑η∗m(η) = λ(C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d − η∗ <
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p · z ≤ d}) for all η∗ and (4) m(0) = 0. Note that property 2 means that m is upper
semicontinuous. Since C is bounded let η¯ > 0 be such that Cη¯ = C. Therefore,
m(η) = λ(C) for all η ≥ η¯.
We will define C1 = C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− η1 ≤ p · z ≤ d} and
Ci = C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− ηi ≤ p · z < d− ηi−1}
for all i = 2, . . . , k, where η1, . . . , ηk are chosen so that 0 < η1 ≤ . . . ≤ ηk, C = ∪ki=1Ci,
λ(int(Ci)) ≤ ci for all i = 1, . . . , k and λ(∪ni=1Ci) ≥
∑n
i=1 ci for all 1 ≤ n ≤ k. Note
that if z ∈ C, then p · z ≤ p · x < p · x + 1 = d; hence, letting η0 = 0, we can write
C1 = C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d − η1 ≤ p · z < d − η0}. Our task is to show the existence of
such η1, . . . , ηk.
For all j = 1, . . . , k − 1, define ηj = min{η : m(η) ≥
∑j
i=1 cj}. Note that ηj is
well defined since {η : m(η) ≥ ∑ji=1 cj} is closed and nonempty; in fact, the second
property follows because m is upper semicontinuous, while the first from the fact that
η¯ ∈ {η : m(η) ≥ ∑ji=1 cj}. Finally, define ηk = η¯ ≥ min{η : m(η) ≥ ∑ki=1 cj}. For
convenience, let ηˆk = min{η : m(η) ≥
∑k
i=1 cj}.
Since c1 > 0 and {η : m(η) ≥
∑j+1
i=1 cj} ⊆ {η : m(η) ≥
∑j
i=1 cj}), it follows that
η1 > 0 and ηj ≤ ηj+1 for all j = 1, . . . , k − 2. Also, ηk−1 ≤ ηˆk ≤ ηk, and so the
inequality ηj ≤ ηj+1 holds for all j = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Since ∪ni Ci = Cηn it follows that λ(∪ni=1Ci) = λ(Cηn) = m(ηn) ≥
∑n
i=1 ci for all
1 ≤ n ≤ k.
We next show that λ(int(Ci)) ≤ ci for all i = 1, . . . , k. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ k. If ηi = ηi−1,
then Ci = ∅ and so the conclusion follows. Therefore, we may assume that ηi > ηi−1.
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In this case, it follows that
int(Ci) = int(C) ∩ int({z ∈ RL : d− ηi ≤ p · z < d− ηi−1})
= int(C) ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− ηi < p · z < d− ηi−1}
⊆ int(C) ∩ (C ∩ {z ∈ RL : d− ηi < p · z ≤ d} \ ∪i−1j=1Cj) .
(63)
Therefore, if i ≤ k − 1, then ηi = min{η : m(η) ≥
∑i
j=1 cj} and so m(η) <
∑i
j=1 cj
for all η < ηi. Thus, limη↑ηi m(η) ≤
∑n
j=1 ci and so
λ(int(Ci)) ≤ lim
η↑ηi
m(η)− λ(∪i−1j=1Cj) ≤
n∑
j=1
cj −
i−1∑
j=1
cj = ci. (64)
If i = k, then
λ(int(Ck)) ≤ λ(int(C))− λ(∪k−1j=1Cj) ≤
k∑
j=1
cj −
k−1∑
j=1
cj = ck.
In conclusion, λ(int(Ci)) ≤ ci for all i = 1, . . . , k.
As we have already pointed out, a measure with a finite support can be thought
of as a vector in some Euclidean space. Roughly, Lemma 10 says that the Prohorov
distance between two measures whose support is contained in some finite set is pro-
portional to their Euclidean distance.
Lemma 10 Let τ, µ ∈ M(X) be such that supp(τ) ∪ supp(µ) ⊆ Ψ, where Ψ is a
finite set. If there exists ε > 0 such that ||τl − µl|| ≤ ε for all 1 ≤ l ≤ |Ψ|, then
ρ(τ, µ) ≤ |Ψ|ε.
Proof. Let ε > 0 and B ⊆ X be Borel measurable. Then,
τ(B) =
∑
l∈Ψ∩B
τ({l}) ≤
∑
l∈Ψ∩B
(µ({l}) + ε) ≤
∑
l∈Ψ∩B
µ({l}) + |Ψ|ε ≤ µ(B|Ψ|ε(B)) + |Ψ|ε.(65)
Similarly, we can show that µ(B) ≤ τ(B|Ψ|ε(B)) + |Ψ|ε. This implies that ρ(τ, µ) ≤
|Ψ|ε.
Lemma 11 shows that in large games a player deviation has a small impact on the
distribution of actions.
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Lemma 11 Let Gn = ((T, νn), U,A) be a game and let f be a strategy. Then,
||νn ◦ f−1 − νn ◦ (f \ω a)−1|| ≤ 1
n
, (66)
for all ω ∈ T and a ∈ A.
Proof. Let ω ∈ Ω and a ∈ A. Let τ = νn ◦ f−1, µ = νn ◦ (f \ω a)−1 and a¯ = f(ω).
If a¯ = a, then τ = µ. If a¯ 6= a, then |τ({a˜})− µ({a˜})| = 0 if a˜ 6= a and a˜ 6= a¯, while
|τ({a˜})− µ({a˜})| = 1/n otherwise, and so ||τ − µ|| = 1/n.
Proof of Lemma 6. The proof is by induction on K. If K = 1, then C1 = X
and so ρ = N = N −K + 1 for all X and N .
Then, suppose that the conclusion holds for all K = 1, . . . , k, N ∈ N and all
convex subsets X of R. Consider K = k+1 and order the sets in B (resp. C) so that
if x ∈ Bi, y ∈ Bj (resp. x ∈ Ci, y ∈ Cj) and i < j, then x < y. These orderings are
possible since for all i = 1, . . . , k + 1 and j = 1, . . . , N are convex subsets of R, and
so intervals. It then follows that ∪kj=1Cj is convex. Let X˜ = ∪kj=1Cj and c = sup X˜.
We consider two cases: the first is when there exists i∗ such that c ∈ Bi∗ . In
the case, ∪i<i∗Bi ⊆ X˜ and {Cj}kj=1 is a partition of X˜, which implies that at least
i∗ − 1 − k + 1 = i∗ − k sets in {Bi}i∗−1i=1 are contained in some Cj, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Since ∪i>i∗Bi ⊆ Ck+1 and |{Bi}Ni=i∗+1| = N − i∗, then ρ ≥ i∗− k+N − i∗ = N − k =
N − (k + 1) + 1, as required.
Finally, if there is no i such that c ∈ Bi, let i∗ = max{i : supBi ≤ c} and the
conclusion follows from the same argument used above.
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